PUDUKKOTTAI STATE
NATIONAL WAR FRONT BUREAU

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Members of the public are requested to make a free present of any suitable old Tamil books they can spare for the perusal, in their leisure time, of our soldiers outside India.

Books so given will be handed over to the Superintendent of the State Press, who will arrange to despatch them.

LECTURE CLIX.

CURTAIN DOWN ON MUSSOLINI'S SHOWMANSHIP.

DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH.

(J. B. Priestley.)

People in Britain are being cheerful rather than excited about the collapse and sudden disappearance from the scene of Mussolini. He has had no friends in Britain for the last three years or so.

From the moment when, thinking it safe to intervene and claim his share of the spoil, he announced that the hour of destiny was at hand, that this was Italy's war too, Mussolini was always a victim of Mr. Churchill's robust scorn and scathing contempt.

In December, 1940, when we had our backs against the wall, Mr. Churchill, broadcasting to the Italian people said: "Our armies are tearing and will tear your African Empire to shreds and tatters; one man and one man alone has ranged the Italian people in deadly struggle against the British Commonwealth. After 18 years of unbridled power, he has brought your country to the horrid verge of ruin".

HEAVY PRICE.

And, now, of course, the ruin is plainly there; a terrible price is being paid for these black-shirted uniforms, for all the strutting and bragging, all the cheap showmanship and the maze of treacheries.

But the price had been heavy enough before the fatal move into this war was made. Vast sums that Italy could not afford were thrown away in Africa. Public money by the million was spent in showmanship for the Party. A rapidly declining standard of living, immense taxes, low wages, no real planning and the country bullied and jockeyed into pretending to be some thing it never could be—a first rate military power. It was, as so many papers have pointed out, Aesop's old fable of the bull-frog all over again.

A SHOWMAN.

I must say that I spent a great deal of time and energy, long before this war began arguing about this man Mussolini. For many people were taken in and thought him a great man. The showmanship did it, of course, Mussolini was always a showman, whereas his more sinister and far more dangerous colleague, Hitler, is some thing more and worse, a kind of witch doctor or medicine man.

But Mussolini's showmanship, which always kept an eye on the tourist, impressed some people. I remember spending nearly the whole of one lunch time about 10 years ago arguing with a very distinguished writer indeed, who although he had no regard for Fascism, told me that Mussolini was at least as great a man as Napoleon. I said that Napoleon was not one of my heroes, but you could cut a dozen Mussolinis out of Napoleon, and then there would be a lot left over.

THE DIFFERENCE.

All that strutting and dressing up and swaggering and screaming was such a bad sign. Really tough strong men do not have to put on a big, tough, strong-man act. They are what they are, and do not have to pretend anything. Cromwell who was the real thing, could weep and would say that he was a weak, sinful creature. Lincoln sprawled in his chair and told funny stories. But Mussolini, you will say, is an Italian, and Italians are a picturesque and dramatic people. Quite so, but the strong men who made modern Italy, the noble Garibaldi and Mazzini and Cavour did not need all this strutting and prancing, all this tremendous build-up of themselves.

You have only to glance at Stalin on a news reel, and then at Mussolini, to see in a flash that the Georgian peasant who has achieved such enormous power is indeed a man of steel. Whereas the Italian, so busy posing, so intent on making his effect, like a character actor, was obviously just a cleverish bluffer.

AN EMPTY PLAY.

I once sat through a play by Mussolini about Napoleon's 100 days. It was a pompous, empty play, not merely amateurish, but all puffed up and hollow, and lacking any real insight and imagination. It gave him away, just as everything he did gave him away.

Why were so many people taken in? I think chiefly because they wanted to be taken in. The kind of people who allowed Mussolini to deceive them were, for the most part, people who hated in their heart of hearts the whole democratic idea and any notion of a critical outspoken common people. People who cherish secretly the image of some vast, swaggering Dictator, surrounded by saluting, uniformed satellites, who settles everything by a mere wave of the hand, who might destroy the organized working class, bully the intellectuals into submission or use concentration camps, threaten the peace and security of the world, who would make trains run to time and clear impudent beggars off the streets.

Well, I like trains to run roughly to time, but not if they are running from one centre of an enslaved and miserable people to another centre of an enslaved and miserable people; and though I think beggars in the streets can be annoying, I would rather see beggars and smiling faces or free men in the streets, than no beggars, no smiles and no free men.

So let these people who saluted and admired Mussolini, wherever they are, take warning. He has gone, and soon his whole gang of uniformed bullies and crooks and the big money men who supported him, will vanish too. We are tired of all these people, they have had too long an innings. The world is not theirs to play about with any longer.

Democracy—and by that I mean a real fighting, vital democracy—is on the march.

WEEKLY WAR SUMMARY.

7—8—43 to 13—8—43.

Sicily.—CATANIA fell on Aug. 5, 26 days after the Sicilian campaign began. Since then the Allies have captured CENTURIPE, PATERNO, MISTERBIANCO, REGALBATO, GAZLIANO, USTICA (an island off PALERMO), ADRANO, BELPASSO, BIAN CAVILLA, BRONTE, ACIRCALE, SAN MARIA DE LICODIA, SAN FATELLO, SAN AGATA, CESARO, GUARDIA, PARAGALO, ZAFFERANA and ST. MARCO ALURZO.

American forces, landed behind the enemy lines, have joined up with the main forces. The British 8th Army has also linked up with the American 7th Army. The Allied Forces now cover three-fourths of the circumference of Mount Etna and are closing in on Etna itself. The Germans who stand on the line of a river north of ACIRCALE near Etna are falling back, sacrificing their Italian comrades. Bitter fighting rages for RANDAZZO.

No Axis ships have entered the Straits of MESSINA for a fortnight. The pounding of the north coastal areas of SICILY continues.

The Axis line is reduced to 45 miles. The Italian mainland is in sight. The situation has become hopeless.

Italy.—The R. A. F. has resumed its activities over ITALY. MILAN the centre of the anti-war demonstrations, TURIN, the home of the Fiat works, and GENOA, the chief commercial port, have been bombed.

Russia.—Following the occupation of BYELGOROD, the Russians have captured ZOLOCHEV, KROMY, GRAIVORON and AKHTYRKA and have closed in on KHARKOV. The Germans are beginning to evacuate KHARKOV. Only one corridor of escape is left.

On the BRYANSK front KHOTYNETS has fallen.

New Russian offensives in the KUBAN (south) upper Donetz and KIROV (centre) areas are reported.

Air-war.—MANNHEIM, LUDWIGSHAFEN and NUREMBERG were bombed. MANNHEIM is an industrial and commercial centre in Central GERMANY manufacturing U-boats. LUDWIGSHAFEN has large chemical works.

S. W. Pacific.—The Allied attack is now concentrated on VILA on KOLOMBANGARA Island, lying opposite to MUNDA across a narrow channel. This is the enemy's last centre of resistance in the area. BAIROKO, south of MUNDA has been surrounded.

A coastal offensive sweep was carried out from WALD Bay to FRIEDRICH KARL Harbour. KIANKWA and BOSTREM Bay in NEW GUINEA were bombed.

In a naval action in Vella Gulf (SOLOMONS) the Japanese lost one cruiser and two destroyers.

Allied bombers also attacked enemy shipping in SALAMAUA, FINSCHHAFEN and the SOLOMONS.

China.—Japanese positions at KEHTIEN on the S. bank of the Yangtse were successfully attacked.

Burma.—On August 9, the railway station at SEDAN, river shipping north of MANDALAY and railroad installations at PAUKKAN were bombed.

On August 10, Japanese targets ranging from the Arakan coast to MANDALAY including AKYAB and PYAWHE were struck.

ALLIED AIR RAIDS.

2—8—43. (Monday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

Day:—
Air-fields at MERVILLE and ST. OMER (France).
An axis convoy off TEXEL Island.
Shipping in the DUNKIRK harbour (France).

NIGHT:—
The port of HAMBURG.
Enemy air-fields at SYLT and CUXHAVEN.
An enemy ship off NORWAY (32 Allied planes missing).

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.
(4 Axis planes destroyed; 2 Allied planes missing).
The communications centres of ADRANO and RANDAZZO (Sicily).
Railway communications at NAPLES (Italy).
Railway installations at REGGIO DI CALABRIA.
Air-fields in Southern ITALY.

RUSSIA.
(180 enemy planes shot down).
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian Front.

FAR EAST.
Air-field at GASMATA (N. Britain).
Barges and a Jap destroyer off the coast of New BRITAIN.
Air-field at SALAMAUA (N. Guinea).
BUIN-FAISI area (N. Guinea).
KAHILI and BOUGAINVILLE Islands.
Enemy shipping at MUNDA (N. Georgja).

3—8—43 (Tuesday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY:—
Offensive sweeps over Northern FRANCE and the ENGLISH CHANNEL.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.
ADRANO (Sicily).
The ports of MILAZZO and MESSINA.
A small vessel off the west coast of GREECE.
Railway commuuications at MARINA DI CATANZARO and PAOLA (Italy).
The submarine base at NAPLES (Italy).
Railway communications at BATTIPAGLIA (Italy).
MESSINA (Sicily).

RUSSIA.
(148 enemy planes shot down).
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

FAR EAST.
The barracks area at MANOKWARI (D.N. Guinea).
Barges in BORGES BAY (N. Britain).
Jetty area at LARAT Island (Tanimbar Island).
Supply dumps along the road to DAUMONIA (N. Guinea).
Isthmus at SALAMAUA.
Enemy installations on both shores of BAIROKO harbour (N. Georgia).
Jap troop positions in the KALEMYO area (Burma).
PAUK (Burma).

4—8—43 (Wednesday).

EUROPE (German occupied).
No information about day and night operations.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.
The railway at TAORMINA (Sicily).
Enemy troops and shipping near MESSINA.
Air-fields in Southern ITALY.
Sweeps over the AEGEAN Sea.

RUSSIA
(168 enemy planes shot down).
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian Front.

FAR EAST.
Jap sea plane base on SHORTLAND Islands.
VILA (Kolombangara).
Air-field and adjacent villages on SELARU Island.
The air-field at GASMATA (N. Britain) and CAPE GLOUCESTER (N. Britain).
KISKA (Aleutians).
Buildings at MAWLAIK and KALEMYO (both in Burma).

5—8—43. (Thursday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY and NIGHT:—
No information.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

Road communications at FRANCAVILLA and ADRANO (Sicily).

Electrical installations in SARDINIA.

Enemy shipping off the west coast of GREECE.

RUSSIA

(114 enemy planes shot down).

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

German armies retreating west of OREL.

FAR EAST.

Air-field at GASMATA (Burma).

Jap positions near SALAMAUA (Burma).

6—8—43 (Friday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY:—

Locomotives and other railway targets in Northern FRANCE.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

Road communications at MESSINA, GESSO and BADJAZZO (Sicily).

Enemy shipping off the SICILIAN CHANNEL.

Docks and Railway communications at NAPLES (Italy).

Troops and trains near MESSINA.

Intruder patrols over Southern ITALY.

RUSSIA.

(80 enemy planes shot down).

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

Railway junctions at KHARKOV, MGA (Leningrad) and BRYANSK.

FAR EAST.

Enemy held village of KEAUK (D.N. Guinea).

Enemy barge concentrations at BOSTREM BAY (N. Guinea).

Barges between WAFD BAY and FRIEDRICH KARL harbour, off REKATA BAY, and BUNSEN point.

Air combats over BUIN-FAISI (7 Jap planes shot down).

Supply dumps in REKATA BAY.

Villages in the AKYAB area (Burma).

7—8—43 (Saturday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

No information about day and night operations.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

Shipping in the MESSINA Straits.

The air-field at CROTONE.

Roads and railway bridges at MARINA DI CATANZARO.

Intruder operations over Southern ITALY.

Factories, Railway stations and other industrial and military targets at MILAN, TURIN and GENOA (Italy).

RUSSIA.

(125 enemy planes shot down).

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian Front.

Railway stations of KARACHEV, LYUBOTIN, MOREFA and OSNOVA.

FAR EAST.

A Jap cruiser and 2 destroyers in VELLA GULF (Solomons) (all sunk).

BAIROKO harbour (New Georgia).

Jap positions at KISKA (Aleutians).

MAUNGDAW (Burma).

River craft along the IRRAWADDY (Burma).

Railroad installatios at YWATAUNG (Burma).

8—8—43. (Sunday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

NIGHT:—

Laying mines in enemy coastal waters.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

Road and railway bridges at CATANZARO, ANGITORO and TROINE (Italy).

Locomotives in South ITALY.

Communications centre at RANDAZZO.

Vehicles and road cars in SICILY.

Shipping off the SICILAN coast.

Barges and troops in MESSINA harbour.

RUSSIA.

(80 enemy planes shot down).

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian Front.

Railway trains and lorry columns at BARVENKOVO, KRASNOGRAD, GUSAROVKA and LO ZOVAYA.

FAR EAST.

The air-field at VILA (Kolombangara).

Japanese ships in the SOLOMONS area.

Jap positions at SALAMAUA and FINSCHHAFEN (N. Guinea).

THAZI dam (Burma).

Road targets at PAUKHAN, AUNGTHA and **the tracks** between SAMON and THABYEDAUNG (Burma).

A motor convoy near HANZA (Burma).

ENEMY AIR RAIDS.

3—8—43 (Tuesday).

BRITAIN.

No enemy air activity.

RUSSIA.

No information.

FAR EAST.

Allied positions near SALAMAUA (N. Guinea).

4—8—43 (Wednesday).

BRITAIN.

No enemy air activity.

RUSSIA.

Air combats over OREL

FAR EAST.

WOODLARK Island area.

5—8—43 (Thursday).

BRITAIN and RUSSIA.

No enemy air activity.

FAR EAST.

Allied positions on RENDOVA Island (12 Jap planes shot down; 2 Allied planes missing).

6—8—43 (Friday).

BRITAIN.

No enemy air activity.

RUSSIA.

Air combats over the KUBAN bridgehead.

FAR EAST.

No information.

7—8—43 (Saturday).

BRITAIN.

No enemy air activity anywhere in BRITAIN.

RUSSIA.

No enemy air activity.

FAR EAST.

An allied ship off the ARAFURA SEA.

8—8—43 (Sunday).

BRITAIN.

No enemy air activity.

RUSSIA.

Rassian positions in the KUBAN bridgehead area.

FAR EAST.

RENDOVA Island (Solomons).

9—8—43 (Monday).

BRITAIN.

No enemy air activity.

RUSSIA.

Very little enemy air activity.

FAR EAST.

No information.

SIDE LIGHTS.

VACILLATION ? Badoglio has said, 'War goes on.' The Allies have replied 'We are going on too.' It is too early to say if Badoglio's decision means vacillation or treachery or stupidity. He has determined on continuing the war while all ITALY demands peace, while he has no more than a battered army back from an African defeat and a depleted navy, to defend his country with, and is faced with the certainty of a SEDAN in SICILY. As it was said of Napoleon after MOSCOW, he must now rob ITALY of 'cradle and grave' to fill the awful gaps in the Italian army. GERMANY has ceased to be a helping partner; GERMANY, as a military power, has ceased even to inspire, her strategy has become out-moded and her victories turned into defeats. Italians are but men, willing neither to become martyrs nor victims in the cause of the hated Germans. How long can Badoglio go on, or his determination last?

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THE PEOPLE'S DEMAND. Representatives of political parties all over ITALY have reminded Badoglio of the 'extreme seriousness of the situation' and demanded 'immediate decision' on grounds of 'the realities of the war' and the wishes of 'the majority of the nation'. From MILAN has come the cry, 'we want peace and work. The Germans must quit Italy.'

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FIDDLING. Allied patience is exhausted. The bombing of Italian cities has been resumed. Badoglio is fiddling while ITALY is burning. Badoglio may play for time, but to the Allies every minute gained is so much humanity saved. If Badoglio plays his game too long he too must go the way of Mussolini. If he stays he will outlive ITALY or see an ITALY scorched and burnt out.

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WEAK AND STUPID ? It may be that Badoglio, though strong enough to replace Mussolini, finds himself unable to get rid of his German masters. If so, his delay is inexcusable and stupid. Had he surrendered, and not allowed the all too precious respite given him to be eaten by the locusts, all would have been well, and ITALY would have been granted peace with honour. But the Allies, who were generous to begin with, could not wait indefinitely. In the words of Lord Cranborne, if the Allies held up to haggle for terms with Badoglio's Government, whose *bona fides* were still in doubt, it would help the Germans and no one else. ITALY should therefore burn till there was a dawn of sense.

The Germans are making hay while Badoglio lasts. They have used the breathing time given by the Allies to entrench themselves in ITALY. They have seized Italian aircraft in the Balkans and repainted them with their own colours.

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HIGGLING ? Perhaps Badoglio still hopes to save something out of the wrecks of the empire that has ceased to be. Perhaps he plays the game to retain himself in power. If so, he has sadly mistaken the temper of both his people and the Allies. ITALY wants peace, and the Allies unconditional capitulation.

If Badoglio hopes to bargain, capitalising the presence of the Germans in ITALY, never was a man more foolish. He can only make the situation worse. The Germans will tighten their grip and the Allies their blockade.

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CONUNDRUM. Perhaps Badoglio's thesis at present is, 'Now that Fascism is gone, why should the Allies fight ITALY?' By this argument perhaps he hopes to appease both the Allies and the Axis. Perhaps he wishes to say to the Germans, 'you see we continue the fight on your side;' to the Allies, 'you see we are no longer Fascist.'

This is Janus-faced. ITALY must cease to worship at the shrine of this doubtful deity before she can recover safety. Even a non-belligerent ITALY is an Allied danger. Even Italian neutrality would neutralise the Allied African and Mediterranean successes, because a neutral ITALY would still be GERMANY's southern bulwark. No, ITALY must not continue to play the German game. The real enemy is GERMANY. So long as Badoglio does not break away from GERMANY he will not really help the Allies. There is no half-way house to peace.

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THE BATTLE FOR SICILY. The final phase of the campaign in SICILY has been reached, and the Allied armies are writing the last chapter in blood and ruin.

Before CATANIA fell—and it was a bitter fight—Allied action had to be slow, partly to save human lives, partly on account of weather and partly in order to move up reinforcements for the final assault.

But after the fall of CATANIA, and of PATERNO, ADRANO and TROINA the Allied advance has gained momentum and the Axis line has been reduced to a bare 45 miles. The fall of ADRANO in particular has cut off the line of communication to MESSINA. 125,000 men have already been taken prisoners. The Straits of MESSINA are under continual fire. The enemy may still attempt a stand at the foot of the Nebrodi range, but the situation has become hopeless.

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CAPE BON? Will it be a CAPE BON? In topography and in the nature of the enemy's defences—booby-traps and land-mines, the battle for the northern tip of SICILY is not unlike the battle for the Tunisian tip. But it differs in that the enemy now has an inner arc of defence around Mt. Etna and can rely to a certain extent on reinforcements, and air-cover, from the 'Toe' of ITALY which is not far off.

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THE RUSSIAN FRONT. The German failure to pinch the Russian bulge at KURSK, and the Russian capture of OREL and BYELGOROD constitute a triple defeat to the Germans. OREL, which the Germans held for two years, was described as a pistol pointed at KURSK, TULA, VORONEJ and MOSCOW. So when the summer began the Germans first fell on KURSK, but soon the tables were turned, the hunter became the hunted. The Russians in turn assaulted OREL. Hitler told his men 'OREL must be defended at all costs' but though the defence was strenuous, the attack was fiercer and OREL fell. Though it did not turn out a second STALINGRAD, it

was the first single Russian victory since STALINGRAD, and a major victory too, for the Allies, demonstrating Hitler's shortage of men. As the battle for OREL lasted for weeks, OREL would have been reinforced if Hitler could. And this was the first stage in the Russian summer offensive.

The second stage was reached with the fall of BYELGOROD, and this has led to the third stage, in which starting from BYELGOROD, the Russians in a triple drive, have reached KHARKOV, the capital of the UKRAINE. KHARKOV is under fire. Between July 5 and August 5 the Germans have lost 120,000 men killed, 4,605 tanks, 1,623 guns, 11,000 lorries and 2,492 aircraft.

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A CITY OF FEAR. BERLIN is now a City of Fear, waiting to be bombed like HAMBURG. The endless stream of wounded and homeless arriving from HAMBURG in the capital has increased the panic. There has been a partial evacuation of BERLIN as Goebbels himself has admitted. Day and night trenches are being dug, shelters strengthened and A. A. reinforcements hurried. Hospitals are being vacated to receive the casualties of the coming air-blitz.

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SPECULATION. Not BERLIN only but several other cities are under evacuation. German Headquarters of late have discussed not only military but political matters, and the High Command has already taken over some of the functions of the civil authorities. A virtual military dictatorship may spring up behind the Nazi facade, but it is too early yet to predict the downfall of Nazism or its leader.

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LOSING THE WILL TO FIGHT. It is apparent that the Germans like the Italians are losing their will to fight. The fall of Mussolini, the rapid conquest of SICILY, and the successive defeats in RUSSIA have had their share in weakening the public confidence. In fact the rot set in much earlier with Rommel's retreat. Von Arnim, who was ordered to fight to the last man and the last round of ammunition, surrendered with 200,000 of his seasoned troops and millions of rounds of ammunition, because Von Arnim lost faith. SICILY, described as impregnable, has been overrun in a few weeks. The German war machine unable to hold out at OREL or BYELGOROD, has now to defend the periphery of a whole continent.

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MILITARY DECLINE. What has brought this military eclipse? In RUSSIA, the German tactics of *blitz*, of tanks first and infantry next, has proved ineffective, and the new Russian method of massed artillery bombardment with infantry infiltration has proved successful. In SICILY, on the other hand, the failure would appear to be due as much to Italian lethargy and bad German generalship as to brilliant planning and leadership on the Allied side.

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AIR WAR. Another potent factor is the air-war. Oil is the Achilles' heel of German war strategy. In this respect the raid on PLOESTI has therefore been the most fateful. HAMBURG, the second city of GERMANY, has practically ceased to exist.

Fifteen months ago these raids did not mean much, in the sense that the bombs were too few and their punch was not heavy. For instance, 340 tons of bombs were dropped in 3 hours on LUBECK (March 28, 1942). But the weight of attack is now much heavier. Let us take more recent instances: HAMBURG (July 26, 1942) 700 tons in 50 minutes; DUISBURG (May 12, 1943), 1,500 tons in 45 minutes; DORTMUND (May 23, 1943), 2,000 tons in 60 minutes and HAMBURG (July 24—27, 1943) 6 raids in 72 hours, 10,000 tons in 10 days. This represents the new technique of 'Concentration *plus* continuity.' Concentration overwhelms the defence. To secure continuity, the R. A. F. delivered the night raid on HAMBURG on July 24, the U.S. Force a daylight attack on July 25; the R. A. F. on the night of July 25, the U. S. Force on July 26 and the R. A. F. on July 27. Decisive results have resulted from these dove-tailed day-and-night Anglo-American operations.

To meet the changed character of the Allied air-offensive, GERMANY has adopted a defensive attitude, increasing her fighters at the expense of bombers. More than 1,000 German fighters have been shot down by Americans alone in the past 11 months over GERMANY.

Another defensive measure which GERMANY once derided and now adopts is wholesale evacuation.

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'INDEPENDENCE' BURMA, says JAPAN, has been granted 'independence' from Aug. 1, and her vassal radios are widely publicising this latest Japanese deceit. The *Azad Hind* is happy that at last the dream has come true of BURMA for the Burmese. But the BATAVIA Radio blurts out: 'The basic law concerning BURMA's national structure is similar to the organic law, which makes JAPAN *indivisible* with MANCHURIA. What is 'organic law'? It is, says Professor TOSHIO TAMURA, that 'MANCHURIA is indivisible because this is the law of development, which is the manifestation of continental JAPAN. The basic spirit lies in the way of Shinto; it makes the sun-goddess the original deity of the foundation of the empire. In the structure of the people, the Japanese who are subjects of Imperial JAPAN are *ipso facto* the central element of MANCHURIA'.

In simpler words MANCHURIA, under the so-called organic law is JAPAN's vassal. This is the honour now conferred on BURMA.

Madame Chiang Kai-Shek explained Japanese independence clearly and forcibly long ago. 'They will say they come to liberate you' she said, 'It is a lie'

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THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC. MUNDA has fallen, and the attack on VILA on KOLAMBANGARA ISLAND, the last of the Japanese air-fields in the area has started. July and August will long be remembered by the Japanese as the months in which the Allied initiative in the S. W. Pacific was first definitely established. In NEW GUINEA, July has seen the frustration of Japanese attempts to reinforce LAE and SALAMAUA. The occupation of MUNDA has given the Allies command over the trail leading to SALAMAUA. Widespread attacks on Japanese bases from JAVA to NEW BRITAIN, of which the latest instance is the action in the Vella Gulf in which one Japanese cruiser and two destroyers were sunk, are furnishing daily proof of Allied naval supremacy in the Pacific waters. Well may Tojo exclaim, 'The war situation is gaining in gravity and we are in truth confronted with a grave period'.

BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS.

(C. M. Franzero.)

Homer tells in the Odyssey that Scylla was a dreadful sea monster with six heads, 12 feet and a voice like the yelp of a puppy ; that she dwelt in a cave in a high rock out of which she stuck her heads and snatched seamen out of passing ships. Within bowshot was another rock under which dwelt Charybdis, who thrice a day sucked in and thrice spouted out the sea water.

Ancient legends always had a rational origin in some natural phenomena. Scylla was on the toe of the Italian peninsula where Reggio Calabria is now; Charybdis stood where Messina is. The ancient saying still used in current language—finding oneself between Scylla and Charybdis—referred to the dangers of crossing the Straits of Messina.

If you stand on the quays of the beautiful port of Messina, you see trains leaving the tip of the Italian peninsula, with their passengers for Sicily, for the narrow channels crossed by ferry boats which carry complete trains coming from Naples and Rome along the west coast of Italy and from Metaponto along the east coast.

At their widest point the Straits are some 10 miles wide, at their narrowest only two but the ferry crosses by preference not from Reggio but from Villa San Giovanni, eight miles north of Reggio, whence the distance to Messina is only five miles. Reggio was totally destroyed in the famous earthquake of December, 1908, and in the centre of the town nearly 40,000 persons perished.

MESSINA.

Messina is, of course, the most important end of the Straits. It is a city of some 185,000 inhabitants, a population which for Italian cities is fairly large. Its history, which would be too long to recount, goes back to the eighth century B. C. when Greek colonists changed its name from Zancle to Messene.

The importance of Messina is due to its harbour—a circular basin open on the north only, formed by a strip of land curving round like a sickle from which the city took its original name, Zancle, before it was changed to Messene.

EXTRAORDINARY SIGHT.

The basin of Messina and the straits proper form one of the most extraordinary sights recorded by geography. At the north end a lowering of the water level by about 300 feet would produce a small isthmus which leads geographers to believe that the origin of the separation of Sicily from Italy may be post-Paleolithic. The straits were most feared by sailors owing to the rocks and whirlpools which gave origin to the legend of Scylla and Charybdis; and the currents do in fact present considerable difficulties, especially in a strong wind. The main current runs south to north and a subsidiary current in the reverse direction. They generally alternate every six hours and are affected by the sun, moon and winds. When the current runs from south to north, the level of water in the straits falls by six to eight inches. It rises as much with the other current ; when the current is particularly strong it tears the seaweed from the bottom and sometimes throws up fish with abnormal eyes, and on stormy nights these luminous creatures of the sea give the straits a terrifying appearance.

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It is over these narrow and most dangerous waters that the Germans will have to endeavour to transport their troops from Sicily when they abandon, as usual, the Italians to their fate. Allied bombers overhead may well induce these Nazi Invaders to think that the Homeric monsters of Scylla and Charybdis are not yet dead.

AXIS AIR FORCE IN SICILY AND ITALY.

(*The Daily Telegraph*).

All Axis aircraft have already left Sicily. With the exception of Messina and its satellite Milazzo, they have no air-fields left there. The remaining eight main air bases and 19 satellites are either in Allied hands or are untenable.

The toe of Italy has only three main air-fields—at Reggio, at San Giovanni and Cotrone and the forward base of Instep—and probably two satellites. These are being heavily pounded day and night and may be considered nearly out of action.

The *Luftwaffe* and the Regia Aeronautica have mostly flown north to their better air bases round Naples and Rome and elsewhere. The *Luftwaffe's* strength in Italy is estimated at about 1,000 aircraft of which approximately 500 are fighters, 250 are twin-engined bombers and the remainder coastal and other squadrons. These are mostly in Central and Northern Italy, although some are known to be in Crete. Possibly a few others are in the Dodecanese. They are equipped with fairly modern aircraft.

Until a few days ago, the Germans were replacing their aircraft and air crew losses in Italy and maintaining their strength. The Regia Aeronautica is thought to have about 1,500, all of which are of obsolete performance and about half are fighters. Nearly all of these are disposed round Naples and Rome, Brindisi and Taranto and in the north. The Allied supremacy in the air over Sicily and Italy is explained by obvious technical and numerical advantages and the tremendous moral ascendancy they induce. Both F. W.—190 and Macchi M. C.—202 fighters of the Axis compare unfavourably with our latest Spitfires. Macchi is out of its class altogether. The Dornier—272 and Savoi—84 bombers are both beginners compared to the Halifax, Lancaster and Stirling and the American Flying Fortress.

Relief to Axis forces in Sicily by air on any scale is out of question by day or night. With complete Allied air control of the island, no troop transports dare operate in any number. A strictly limited number of air movements by night are possible but always subject to attack by Allied intruders. German propaganda is saying that if the Italians give in, the Allies will use their country as a base and the *Luftwaffe* will bomb Italian towns. It is pointed out, however, that the Germans could not for long implement their threat. The United Nations have very powerful fighter forces with which to protect Italy. Also the Germans could not for long spare many of their comparatively inferior bombers from the Russian front.

POSSIBILITY OF GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ITALY.

(*Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Brownrigg*).

There is nothing wrong in rejoicing over good news so long as the probable consequences of the happy event are not overestimated.

The man who has been responsible for leading Italy to disaster has disappeared from the scene, but the news means much more than that; it is the first practical expression of the nation's change of heart. **The lesson we have to learn is that this change of heart has been brought about by hard knocks and not by hard words.**

As I see it, the problem now facing the Axis in Europe will be solved in Berlin and not in Rome. The German General Staff must decide (or in truth must already have decided) whether they can afford to prop up their tottering ally by sending him reinforcements or whether to leave him to his fate.

Let us face up—as the General Staff have had to do—to the advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives.

Before considering academically the pros and cons of the first course, I feel sure that the businesslike and highly efficient members of the German High Command will have taken stock of their resources; I am pretty confident that they will have been sadly disappointed. They can hardly have thought it the right moment to take troops or aircraft from Leningrad, or the Kuban; they cannot more easily be spared just now from France—at least not until Eisenhower has taken Sicily and played his next card. It is very awkward to move troops from the long, much advertised, Continental West Wall when the air forces of Britain and America have loosed a crescendo of falling bombs over Hamburg and the Ruhr and there is nothing much more to be got out of the Balkans. At this stage of their discussion, I fancy that the German High Command will have discarded any idea of sending the Italians any reinforcements; but they will have got some solace from finding an excellent reason for not doing so. They will say that Italian morale is so inferior to that of the herrenvolk that it is not worth the life of another German soldier to keep such a miserable ally by their side. They can thus escape admitting the real reason—their resources are insufficient for the task.

The second alternative will, in my view, have been accepted and it will be very quickly implemented. But this will not mean a hurried departure of all Germans from the Italian soil. It will develop into a well-conducted retreat covered by an effective rearguard. The first Germans to start for home will be the administrative services in the rear for whom there is no further need. The last to come will be the German armies of the north which will be left to the end to execute reprisals to bring discredit on the new régime, should the Italians in the south show any disposition to interfere with the orderly withdrawal of German troops. This forecast will be proved or disproved in the course of the next few days; but of one thing there is no possible doubt—the first major crack has appeared in the Axis facade.

A MESSAGE TO MALTA, G. C.

(*Lieut. General Sir William Dobbie G. C. M. G., K. C. B., D. S. O.*)

Since I last spoke to you much has happened. There have been great and wonderful developments in the situation, which have affected the whole of our outlook, not only in the Mediterranean but in the whole world. It is, I think, true to say that no place in our Empire has been more profoundly affected by these happenings than has Malta—and that is a thing at which I greatly rejoice.

I frequently look back on the last twelve months, and note the path which the people of Malta have, in the providence of God, been called upon to tread. I remember well the conditions prevailing this time last year while I was still in Malta. Malta was at that time going through a grim and prolonged ordeal. The constant and heavy attacks by the *Luftwaffe* against the fortress will not be forgotton by those who experienced them, and by the same token the extremely heavy losses inflicted by Malta on the enemy will not be forgotten by them.

It was, as I say, a grim ordeal, but it certainly was not a profitless one. The enemy tried to stop the offensive being carried on from Malta. In this he failed, and the happenings since in Egypt, Libya and Tunis are a proof that Malta did make some contribution to these successes.

Moreover, the ordeal through which Malta passed was of real value to our cause for another reason as well. The force of the *Luftwaffe* which the enemy had to detach to Sicily, and the tremendous losses which that force sustained, must have imposed a tremendous strain on his resources; and at a time when he dearly wanted to use them against Russia, where he was losing his air supremacy. Malta's ordeal, therefore, not only helped the Eigth Army in Africa, but it undoubtedly helped our Russian Allies as well.

As Malta looks back on that grim period it can be thankful that it was privileged to serve our Allied cause in this direct fashion, and that its sufferings were not in vain.

But, of course, Malta's ordeal was not only because of the bombs that the enemy dropped from the skies. It lay also in the stern necessity imposed on the island to economise in food and other necessaries so that they might be eked out to the limit and last as long as possible. That was a necessity which Malta understood and accepted. It knew the price that the Royal Navy had to pay to bring ships to Malta with the longed-for supplies. Malta was determined not to impose any unnecessary burden on these two magnificent Services, and thus accepted hardships and privations of the greatest severity. I would like to assure the people of Malta that what they underwent in the matter of these privations has not passed unnoticed in Britain. The spirit with which the people have faced all the dangers that threatened them has won the high regard of the whole Empire, and indeed of the world, and I do not tire in telling this country what a great contribution that spirit has made to our cause.

From the moment when Italy entered the war against us all dangers have been faced calmly and confidently by the people and garrison of the fortress. The dangers arising out of the extreme weakness of our defences in the early days, the incessant air attacks designed to break the spirit of the people, and the hardships due to the acute shortage of supplies—all these things have been faced with real courage and determination. And as a result, and especially on account of God's great goodness to us all, Malta to-day remains in British hands, and is ready to play whatever further róle may be assigned to her.

Individuals and peoples learn, or should learn, by experience, and very often they learn most in the hard school of adversity and ordeal. I often look back over the past, and certain lessons from what we passed through together seem to stand out in relief against the background of the grim happenings of those days. If we want to play our part in the future and pull our weight, we need to think of these lessons in the past, and

apply them in the future. Three of these lessons seem to me to be especially prominent. They are as follows :—

First.—Courage and determination in individuals or communities are just as necessary to-day as ever. It is the spirit of a man or a people that matters, and not only the material resources that may be available. Let us see to it then that we foster the right spirit in our lives, so that we may face the future with courage and determination.

Second.—Co-operation between various persons and communities is of untold value in the face of common dangers and difficulties. I mean, of course, co-operation in spirit and not only in the letter. We shall need it to the full in the dangers and problems that still lie ahead of us. Selfishness, whether in individuals or in peoples or sections of the people, must at all costs be eradicated, if we are to derive the full benefits of the schooling we have undergone. We want to aim at the common good, realising that 'No man liveth unto himself.'

Third.—As we look back, we gladly acknowledge all those whose devotion and courage have so wonderfully contributed to the successful defence of Malta. But surely we see over and above all these the good hand of our God upon us, and realise something of what we owe to Him for His help and protection. That is a lesson which we must not forget. We must realise that in the future, as in the past, we cannot do without His help, and we must ensure that there is nothing in us, individually or collectively, that will prevent Almighty God from giving that help to us.

FEATURES OF RECENT BOMBING OFFENSIVE.

LOW RATE OF LOSS BY BOMBER COMMAND.

(*The Times.*)

Improved weather during the week ending July 31 made possible the unleashing of pent-up bomber forces at night and by day against the heart of Germany.

In the East, Russia advances. In the South, Italy falters. All the time Germany is being pounded from the air as no country has ever been. The three aspects link together in the gigantic and possibly decisive offensive.

While the R. A. F. is dealing principally with the enemy's heavy industries, the Americans are whittling down the *Luftwaffe's* fighter force. Once that force has cracked, Germany's power to make war could—and would—be swamped from the air in preparation for the final assault on land.

Undoubtedly, two outstanding features of the recent air operations have been, firstly, the low rate of loss by the Bomber Command at night during the heaviest and the most concentrated atttacks ever launched; and, secondly, very deep penetrations successfully achieved by American Fortress bombers despite intense opposition. Whereas the technique of area bombing at night is to concentrate the maximum possible force on a single target in the shortest possible time, each aeroplane flying and aiming individually, the technique of precision bombing in daylight is to send no more than about 100 bombers to any one target and "blanket" the aim-point completely by bombing all together in formation.

There is no doubt that each big raid on Hamburg could have exceeded 4,500 tons, if high explosive bombs only had been carried, and no space were used for incendiaries or for flares necessary for night work. However, for large industrial targets, a mixture of "blockbusters" and incendiaries gives the best results. For precision targets, high explosive bombs probably yield the best dividends.

Although night bombers have suffered exceptionally low losses during the week under review, that was not because of any real slackening in defensive effort. Reports seem to indicate that many mobile anti-aircraft batteries were removed from Hamburg to the Ruhr when the first attack took place on July 24. These mobile guns were hurried back, but their aiming was utterly swamped by the fact that the whole attack was concentrated into so short a time.

On the other hand, German night fighter defences are now on a very great scale using radio location aids to pick up bombers.

Day bombers over Germany also met great numbers of fighters which included black painted night fighters. Obviously, the enemy had not expected such deep penetrations by day, and in consequence did not have large numbers of day fighters around such targets as Kassel. The Americans have now proved that day bombing can take its place beside night bombing in deep penetrations into Germany, and that one need is to build up a bomber force of sufficient strength to maintain an offensive on the most powerful scale.

Given another month or so of good bombing weather, far-reaching results may be obtained by night and day air offensive from Great Britain linking in with momentous operations on other fronts—depriving the enemy at once of the means to make war and the prospect of anything but still more ruin to come.

THREE POINTERS TO INVASION MOVES TO COME.
FAILURE OF U-BOAT AS CARGO CARRIERS.

(*A. J. McWhinnie.*)

Sicily has provided three highly significant pointers to the invasion moves yet to come.

(1) Axis war scientists have failed to prodrce—so far—an unbeatable mine for lining beaches and coastal waters.

(2) U-boats cannot keep back well-screened seaborne invasion forces.

(3) Battleships, despite all the controversy in the past few years, are still the backbone of big-scale moves on the seas.

If the Axis had an unbeatable mine, and if U-boats were able to act as first-class frontline anti-invasion units, the whole story of the Sicilian venture would have been different.

There were British battleships covering the invasion, ready to pounce if the Italian fleet made a move, and if the Italians doubted this they were not left in doubt for long. First came the bombardment of Catania, then came other indications that the British and American naval strength close to Mussolini's shores was in fact greater than had been first thought.

There have been many people in Britain who have been saying for years that the days of the battleship had passed, and that air-strength had sounded the death knell of the great £ 10,000,000 capital ships.

British and American faith in battleships as a final argument is reflected in the fact that both nations are still building new battleships—battleships bigger and more powerful than the existing classes.

Axis faith is still pinned on the U-boat as the one hope of achieving success—a diminished hope.

There has been no greater evidence of the one-track Teutonic mind than the impression they are trying to give that U-boats are playing a big part in beating the Allied blockade.

From Washington came a story that the big Italian U-boats are being stripped of their armament under German orders and are being used as under-water cargo-carrier. presumably between Germany and Japan. I had already foreseen and mentioned the possibility of U-boats being pressed into service as blockade-runners for special purposes. But I still cannot believe that such a service can be either regular or adequate.

The idea is not new. The Deutschland, the Bremen and four other submarine cargo-carriers were pressed into the service of Germany's navy in the last war. The Deutschland carried dyes, mails and precious stones to Baltimore in 1916 before America entered the last war, but made two trips only. The Bremen set off for Norfolk, Virginia, but never reached her destination. Practically nothing was heard of the other four.

In Britain's darkest days of this war in the Mediterranean, the submarine was used as an under-water freighter to relieve hardpressed Malta. One of the commodities that the submarines carried was powdered milk for Malta's children. But there is a big difference between a submarine trip halfway through the Mediterranean and halfway round the world.

It is not unreasonable that a U-boat should sail with specially needed goods or despatches between Europe and Japan. But apart from its propaganda value, the effort does not strike me as being economically worth while.

Germany needs at least 180,000 tons of rubber per year from the Japanese territories I doubt if the biggest U-boat could carry more than 200 tons of cargo. And I very much doubt if a single U-boat could do more than a couple of trips per year. So in a year, one U-boat could bring only 400 tons. It is less than a very small schooner could achieve.

The very fact that submarines are even being thought of as cargo-carriers, is the greatest proof yet that Germany realises that the Allied stranglehold over the seas is now so great that even isolated blockade-runners invite overwhelming risks in trying to link up the East with the West.

And every U-boat converted for blockade-running means one fewer U-boat to be turned against the increased flow of Allied shipping.

GERMANY'S OIL POSITION.

FACTS AND ESTIMATES.

(*Daily Herald*).

The bombing of the Ploesti oil refineries brings into the forefront once again the whole question of Axis supplies.

Much has been written in the past four years on this subject—much of it has been proved nonsense.

It is a subject on which you cannot stick to facts. You can only deal with estimates—estimates that vary by millions of tons. But there are some points that are indisputable.

The refineries, are much more vulnerable than oil wells. All crude petroleum from the wells must pass through the refineries before it is of any use to anybody. There are about 30 oil refineries in Rumania. Half of them are at Ploesti, and these are the main ones and handle 80 per cent of the country's output.

Another refinery centre is Campina, about 30 miles north-west of Ploesti. All Rumania's refineries, working at top pressure, could handle 11,000,000 tons of crude oil in a year. This is twice the country's present output. We need to knock out a lot of refineries to cause an appreciable effect.

Rumania's oil output, however, is declining every year. British and American experts have gone. There are a few competent Rumanian and German oil engineers. Special equipment, particularly that required for deep drilling, has been introduced in the past only in America. Lack of necessary alloy steels has made it impossible for any European works to produce drilling rigs and heavy pumping units of high enough quality for satisfactory working in Rumania's deep wells.

Rumanian oil is not particularly suitable for production of high-grade lubricants or aviation spirit. Nevertheless, it is now one of the principal Axis sources of supply, any curtailment of which is bound to cause embarrassment. So much for facts and now for estimates.

It has been calculated that for full prosecution of the war by herself and her satellites, Germany needs about 20,000,000 tons of oil every year. With stringent economies, she can get along with 15,000,000. While conducting a full-scale offensive, say, on the Russian front, between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 tons are used up in a month. In quieter periods between offensives about 1,000,000 tons a month are used. We know that Germany gets abouts 5,500,000 from Rumania, 2,500,000 from Albania, 235,000 from Hungary, 120,000 from Poland and 1,100,000 from. Greater Germany. This is just over 7,000,000 tons. The rest must be synthetic fuel.

It is impossible to estimate how much synthetic oil she is now producing, as there obviously have been vast developments in this field during the war. It seems impossible that she has been able to accumulate any big stocks even in the lulls between campaigns. But what is sure is that Rumania provides about a third of her total supply. Last winter Germany's hopes were fixed on the Caucasian oil-fields with their production of nearly 30,000,000 tons yearly. Those hopes came to nothing. That is why we can now watch with interest the results of Ploesti bombing and any other bombing of similar oil targets.

ALLIES IN THE PACIFIC.

DUTCH FORCES ON AUSTRALIAN SOIL.

(*The London Times.*)

The Dutch are playing an important if unspectacular rôle in the war in the Pacific. A Dutch squadron complete with Dutch ground staff has been stationed at Darwin for several weeks. Its North American Mitchell bombers are making raids almost daily in

the north-western sector. Dutch markings on the wings are concrete evidence to Indonesians that the Dutch are playing their part in the struggle against the Japanese. In addition to bombers, several American transport aeroplanes are now being flown by Dutch crews. Some of the pilots were formerly with the K. L. I. N. M., and have an astronomical number of flying hours to their credit. The best known of them is Captain Ivan Smirnoy, once a pilot in the Imperial Russian Army, who on his last flight from Java brought out diamonds to the value of 2,000,000 guilders (£ 300,000).

INDONESIAN UNITS.

In the military sphere there are in Australia at the present time certain Indonesian units of the Netherlands East Indian Army which reached Australia after resisting the Japanese in Timor and Western Dutch New Guinea and the island groups in the Arafula Sea. These men are now undergoing special training, for it is obvious that they will be of the greatest value as guides and interpreters, and in other specialized jobs, when military operations are launched against the Japanese in the Indies. On the occasion of a recent parade in Melbourne these stocky little Indonesian soldiers in their green uniforms received a greater ovation than any of the other allied units which participated.

It is perhaps in the sphere of shipping that the concrete Dutch contribution to the war effort is greatest. Dutch warships are serving both under Vice-Admiral Carpender's command in the south-west Pacific and under Admiral Somerville's command in the Indian Ocean. They are carrying supplies between Australia and New Caledonia, between Australia and the United States, and in the waters round the Solomons. One of the pleasantest places in Melbourne is a well-equipped Dutch canteen where Dutch and Indonesian men from the fighting forces congregate when on leave. Excellent Dutch Bols gin, without which any Dutch male gathering would somehow seem incomplete, now comes from a factory in Argentina.

There is also a side to the Dutch contribution which is no less important for being largely invisible. In the task of garnering intelligence from areas under Japanese control, and in providing expert detailed knowledge of the terrain of the Indies, the Dutch perform a valuable service in helping the Allied High Command to follow the plans of the enemy and anticipate his movements. On the civilian side, the Dutch are still disposing of various materials purchased in America and elsewhere before the Japanese entered the war. When Java fell, many of these goods were either in Australia or on the way here. The N. E. I. Government commission (then headed by J. E. van Hoogstraten, formerly Director of Economic Affairs in the Indies) had to dispose of a vast accumulation. War materials, including aeroplanes, tanks and armaments of all sorts, were disposed of fairly quickly to the Allied forces in Australia. The disposal of civilian goods has taken longer.

The most interesting and perhaps most important of all activities of the Dutch in Australia are those of a preparatory nature. The Dutch are confident that one day they will go back to the Indies. They feel they must plan now against that day.

A JOINT COMMONWEALTH.

It would be foolish to pretend that the Dutch in the East are not disappointed at the course of the war out here. Hardly one of them but has his wife and children in the Indies, from Vice Admiral Helfrich and Hr. van der Plas down to the Indonesian soldiers and seamen. When they left the Indies they hoped the separation would be short and that they would soon return triumphantly. The "Beat Hitler First" policy had not yet become fully apparent. Thus a certain disappointment is natural. But nearly all of

them are behind the allied strategy and desire the liberation of their homeland as ardently as the liberation of their adopted homeland.

There is indeed something magnificent about the steadfastness and singlemindedness of the Dutch. They realize, of course, that there will be big changes in the Netherlands East Indies after the war. Queen Wilhelmina has already given a lead by announcing plans for a future commonwealth, in which Dutch and Indonesians will have equal rights, with component parts enjoying their own representative institutions, but submitting to a central unified defensive command. Certainly none who has seen for himself the achievements of the Dutch in the East Indies, or witnessed the resolute behaviour of the Dutch when the hour of crisis came and they were attacked by the enemy, or considers their close identification with the Indonesian peoples, an association lasting three and a half centuries, can doubt that the Dutch have vindicated their claim to be considered as a western nation enjoying a paramount interest in the East Indies after the war. The Dutch to-day in Australia, by their contributions to the war effort, visible and invisible, are still further vindicating that claim.

THE GERMAN "TIGER" TANK.

The Mark VI "Tiger" tank which the Germans are using on the Russian front to-day seems to be of the same model and design as the one they used in Tunisia last February.

It is a monster of between fifty-two and sixty-two tons, armed with an eighty-eight millimetre high-velocity cannon and four heavy machine guns. The tank carries a crew of eight and has a tiger painted on its turret. The outstanding feature of the "Tiger" is its massive armour. In vulnerable frontal parts this is reported to reach a maximum of seven and a half inches; its side armour has a maximum thickness of five inches.

Huge tanks of sixty tons and up, while possessing big advantages in firepower and defensive armour, also suffer from disadvantages inherent in their own enormous weight. The "Tiger" has relatively a slow speed of twenty-two miles an hour and its weight restricts its operational scope also. Few bridges and roads can sustain the load of a fleet of these heavy tanks.

Experience in Tunisia has shown that the Allies' most effective answer is the new heavy artillery which has been developed. The American one hundred and five millimetre self-propelled field gun, mounted on a General Grant Tank chassis, can deal with any known tank.

THE WISDOM OF THE YOUNG.

The following is the text of a leaflet issued by Hans and Maria Scholl, and Adrian Probst, on behalf of Munich Students. Munich's *Gauleiter*, Herr Giesler, beheaded them on February 22, 1943:—

"The eyes of even the most stupid Germans, these eyes have been opened by the terrible blood bath in which Hitler and his confederates are trying to drown all Europe in the name of the freedom of the German nation. Germany's name will remain for ever dishonoured if German youth does not at last rise up, avenge and destroy its tormentors—Girl students and men students, the nation looks to us. It expects from us in 1943 the breaking of the National Socialist terror—even as in 1814 the Napoleonic terror was broken.

"The dead of Stalingrad exhort us. Arise, ye people, the time has come."

'V' DIARY, 1944.

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PUDUKKOTTAI STATE NATIONAL WAR FRONT BUREAU

PROGRAMME.

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Date	Place	Time
14- 8-43	Municipal Office	6.00 p.m.
15- 8-43	Kilanilai	7.00 „
„	Kilanilai-Puduppatti	7.30 „
16- 8-43	Perumanadu	7.00 „
„	Pulvayal	7.30 „
17- 8-43	Sadayampatti	7.00 „
„	Oliyamangalam	7.30 „
18- 8-43	C. S. M. High School	10.00 a.m.
„	Rani's High School	10.45 „
18- 8-43	College A English	10.45 a.m.
„	College B Tamil	10.45 „
„	Annavasal	7.00 p.m.
„	Kilakkurichchi	7.30 „
19- 8-43	Malampatti	7.00 „
„	Perambur	7.30 „
20- 8-43	Alavayal	7.00 „
„	Ammankurichchi	7.30 „

LECTURE CLX (*Batch 5*).

Date	Place	Time
21- 8-43	Municipal Office	6.00 p.m.
22- 8-43	Kiranur	7.00 „
„	Nanjur	7.30 „
23- 8-43	Puvarasakudi	7.00 „
„	Venkatakulam	7.30 „
24- 8-43	Perungalur	7.00 „
„	Adanakkottai	7.30 „
25- 8-43	C. S. M. High School	10.00 a.m.
„	Rani's High School	10.45 „
25- 8-43	College A English	10.45 a.m.
„	College B Tamil	10.45 „
„	Mirattunilai	7.00 p.m.
„	Arimalam	7.30 „
26- 8-43	Pungudi	7.00 „
„	Satyamangalam	7.30 „
27- 8-43	Udayalippatti	7.00 „
„	Killukottai	7.30 „

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17— 8—43	Kudumiyamalai.
18— 8—43	Karambakkudi.
19— 8—43	Kilanilai.
20— 8—43	Pudukkottai.
21— 8—43	Ponnamaravathi.
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24— 8—43	Vadakadu.
25— 8—43	Rayavaram.
26— 8—43	Alangudi.
27— 8—43	Pudukkottai.

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